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Of Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning 
 
Cass R. Sunstein* 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Can computers, or artificial intelligence, reason by analogy? This essay urges that 
they cannot, because they are unable to engage in the crucial task of identifying the 
normative principle that links or separates cases. Current claims, about the ability of 
artificial intelligence to reason analogically, rest on an inadequate picture of what legal 
reasoning actually is. For the most part, artificial intelligence now operates as a kind of 
advanced version of LEXIS, offering research assistance rather than analogical reasoning. 
But this is a claim about current technology, not about inevitable limitations of artificial 
intelligence; things might change in the future. 
 
 
 
 
I. HYPO and Analogy 
 
The computer on which I am now writing is capable of many impressive 
feats. Sometimes it talks to me. It can recognize spelling errors and point them 
out to me. It is astonishing how many words it seems to know. My computer can 
also find (some) bad writing, and it lets me know when I should rewrite (some) 
bad sentences. Everyone also knows that the best computer chess player can beat 
the best human chess player. Fewer people know that an onboard computer 
system from Carnegie Mellon University has driven a ban almost all of the 2849 
miles from Washington, DC to San Diego, California, both day and night, in the 
rain, and with an average of 63 miles per hour.1 But this is only the barest tip of 
the iceberg. 
 
                                                 
* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago, Law School and 
Department of Political Science. 
1 See David Waltz, Artificial Intelligence: Realizing the Ultimate Promises of Computing (2000), 
http://www.cs.washington.edu/homes/lazowska/cra/ai.html. 
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Can computers engage in legal reasoning too? Can they do it well? Even 
better than people? Some grounds for an affirmative answer might emerge from 
the simple observation that much of legal reasoning is analogical in nature.2  In 
ordinary life, analogical reasoning often takes the form, White House is to 
President as X is to Congress, with the solution consisting of a judgment that X is 
the Capitol Building. The task of identifying good analogies - the kind of task 
imposed on high school students - seems to be the sort of thing on which 
computers can excel. If this is right, perhaps computers can do well in law too, 
simply because legal reasoning is pervasively analogical and based on close 
attention to past cases. An understanding of the relationship between artificial 
intelligence and legal reasoning might well illuminate both of these endeavors. 
 
It is best to anchor the discussion in an illustration. Suppose that the rule 
in state A is that employers can discharge employees “at will,” that is, for any 
reason or for no reason at all. Suppose that an airline then discharges a copilot 
for refusing to fly a plane that the copilot believes to be unsafe to fly.3 Is the latter 
discharge lawful? 
 
Let us assume that there are many analogies in the relevant jurisdiction. 
Suppose that the courts in state A have created a series of public policy 
exceptions to the at will rule – that they have said that an employer cannot be 
discharged for refusing to commit a crime, or for obtaining workers’ 
compensation benefits, or for cooperating with the police about potential 
criminal activity  on the part of the employer. Suppose too that courts have 
limited by the reach of the public policy argument by allowing employers to 
discharge employees for smoking on the premises, for reporting to the 
Community Credit Bureau about possible regulatory violations by a bank, and 
for engaging in political activity, outside of the workplace, on behalf of 
candidates of whom the employers disapproves. Might it be possible for a 
computer to find, or show, which cases are “most” analogous to the discharge of 
the copilot, and which cases are “least” analogous to it? 
 
A number of people have attempted to answer this question in the 
affirmative -- to show the potential role of artificial intelligence in assisting 
lawyers, and perhaps even in engaging in legal reasoning. I will use as an 
illustration an extremely interesting book by Kevin Ashley, which makes some 
striking claims about the role of computer programs in analogical reasoning in 
                                                 
2 See Edward  Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning (1949). 
3 See Buethe v. Britt Airlines, 787 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir 1986). 
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law.4 Ashley has created a computer program, HYPO, which appears to excel at 
providing assistance in trade secrets cases. If a HYPO is told about a case, HYPO 
will, among other things, draw up a set of analogous cases; tell you how they are 
similar and how they might be distinguished; rank them in order of 
analogousness; and even give you arguments about how to meet the claim that 
the cases are different from the case at hand, with citations. Ashley suggests that 
HYPO is far more useful, in many ways, that Lexis and Westlaw, insofar as the 
latter simply rely on “keywords” in past cases.  
 
More strikingly, he shows that HYPO’s performance, when confronted 
with a fact pattern, is not so different from the performance of actual judges. 
HYPO tends to refer to the same cases and to make the same arguments about 
how they are similar and different; HYPO even make similar responses to claims 
that cases are similar and different.  But Ashley’s conclusion is still more 
ambitious: “If lawyers argue with precedents precisely because it is not feasible 
to prove the right answer by deductive logic, then the goal of a theory of 
analogical legal argument should not be to explain what the right answer is. 
Precedential reasoning is interesting precisely because, even without logical 
necessity, there still may be an ordering to the persuasiveness of arguments. The 
appropriate goal for a theory of arguing from precedents is to describe that order 
accurately. . . . Hypo is a step toward such a theory.”5 
 
How does HYPO provide “a step” toward a theory of accurately 
describing the “order” of the persuasiveness of arguments? How would we 
know if artificial intelligence is actually engaging in legal reasoning? 
 
II. Weak and Strong 
 
A. Hypotheses 
 
What I am going to urge here is that there is a weak and strong version of 
the claims for artificial intelligence in legal reasoning; that we should accept the 
weak version; and that we should reject the strong version, because it is based on 
an inadequate account of what legal reasoning is. We should reject the strong 
version not because artificial intelligence is, in principle, incapable of doing what 
the strong version requires (there is no way to answer that question, in 
principle), but because there is no evidence that, at the present time, any 
                                                 
4 Kevin D. Ashley, Modeling Legal Argument (1990). 
5 Id. at 254. 
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computer program is in a  position to do what is necessary. To the question, can 
computer programs engage in legal reasoning, the best answer is therefore: Not 
yet. 
 
According to the weak version, artificial intelligence can serve as a large 
improvement on existing computerized services such as Lexis and Westlaw, 
because well-designed programs are able to assemble an array of relevant cases, 
to suggest similarities and differences, and to sketch arguments and 
counterarguments. This is a true and important point. On the strong version, 
artificial intelligence can now engage in legal reasoning, because a well-designed 
program can tell a lawyer, or even a judge, what cases are really closest to the 
case at hand, and what cases are properly distinguished from it. I believe that the 
strong version is wrong, because it misses a central point about analogical 
reasoning: its inevitably evaluative, value-driven character. 
 
What is legal reasoning? Let us agree that it is often analogical. In his 
classic discussion of legal reasoning, Edward Levi rightly emphasizes this point.6 
But in doing so, Levi makes a serious mistake: He suggests that when engaged in 
reasoning by example, courts ask what case is “more” similar to the case at 
hand.7 It is much more accurate to say that analogizers in law have to ask which 
case has relevant similarities to the case at hand. It is more accurate still to say 
that whether a case has relevant similarities to the case at hand depends on the 
principle for which the initial case is said, on reflection, to stand. It follows that 
the crucial step in analogical reasoning consists, not in a finding of “more” 
similarities, not in establishing “many” distinctions, and not even showing 
“relevant” similarities and differences, but instead in the identification of a 
principle that justifies a claim of similarity or difference. Because the 
identification of that principle is a matter of evaluation, and not of finding or 
counting something, artificial intelligence is able to engage in analogical 
reasoning only to the extent that it is capable of making good evaluative 
judgments.  
 
The point is illuminated by Ronald Dworkin’s influential work on legal 
reasoning.8 Dworkin says that “analogy without theory is blind. An analogy is a 
way of stating a conclusion, not a way of reaching one, and theory must do the 
                                                 
6 See Levi, supra note 1. 
7 Id. at 3, note 8. 
8 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1985). 
 6
real work.”9 I think that this view is too simple; an analogy is partly a way of 
reaching a conclusion, because it helps people to understand and to assess the 
principles to which they are actually committed. But Dworkin is right to say that 
analogical thinking cannot get off the ground without some kind of theory or 
principle, helping to unify or divide the case at hand and the cases that have 
come before.  
 
We can therefore venture a hypothesis: Since HYPO can only retrieve 
cases, and identify similarities and differences, HYPO cannot really reason 
analogically. The reason is that HYPO has no special expertise is making good 
evaluative judgments. Indeed, there is no reason to think that HYPO can make 
evaluative judgments at all. 
 
B. An Example 
 
Consider the problem with which I began. Is an airline permitted to 
discharge a copilot who refuses to fly a plane on the ground that it is unsafe to 
fly? Let us see how HYPO might be helpful on this question. In a way, HYPO 
might show, this case like a case in which an employee discharges someone for 
refusing to commit perjury. In both cases, the employer’s action threatens to 
injure third parties. On the other hand, HYPO might add, the cases are 
distinguishable: The discharge by the airplane does not threaten to produce a 
crime, and in any case the airplane seems to have a legitimate interest in 
ensuring that safety judgments are made by pilots rather than copilots. Perhaps 
HYPO will note that in a way, the airplane case is “most” like the decision 
allowing employees to be fired for reporting possible regulatory violations by a 
bank. In the airplane case, however, the discharge would have more serious 
consequences, including massive deaths. Doesn’t this distinction make a 
difference? 
 
The only way to answer these questions, and to come to terms with the 
universe of analogies, is to settle on a principle that explains why the case at 
hand should fall on one or another side of the line. We might say, for example, 
that an employer is never permitted to discharge an employee as a result of an 
objectively reasonable judgment, by the employee, that a certain course of action 
is necessary to save lives. This principle does not conflict with any of the 
precedents. Or we might say that an employer is always permitted to discharge 
an employee when the employee has refused to accept a reasonable order from a 
                                                 
9 Ronald Dworkin, In Praise of Theory, Ariz. State L. J. (1997). 
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hierarchical superior, if that order (a) is job-related and (b) would not require the 
employee to commit a crime. This principle does not conflict with any of the 
precedents. 
 
How should a court choose among the two possible principles? How 
should a lawyer persuade a court to make that choice? It is not helpful to say that 
the question is which precedent is “closer” to the case at hand. Whether a 
precedent is closer depends not on a factual inquiry, but on identification of a 
(normative) principle by which “closeness” can be established.  It is more helpful 
to proceed by asking which principle is actually better. How can we figure that 
out? An important question is whether the pro-employee principle, in the airline 
case, would actually improve safety on balance (or instead perhaps impair, as the 
court of appeals suggested in the case). Another important question is whether 
the pro-employee principle would disrupt airplane operations, by giving co-
pilots a right to veto flights when safety is not much of an issue. It is worthwhile 
to note that these are empirical issues. Judges may not know how to answer 
them. But my guess is that HYPO, with its admittedly excellent database, knows 
even less.  
 
There is yet another avenue for progress, involving an assessment of the 
proposed principle by seeing if it is inconsistent, from the normative point of 
view, with anything else that we believe, or to which the legal system would 
likely commit itself. Here HYPO is not entirely unhelpful, but it can hardly do 
what needs to be done. I think that Dworkin is correct to suggest that legal 
reasoning often consists of an effort to make best constructive sense out of past 
legal events.10 If analogical reasoning is understood in this light, the analogizer 
attempts to make best constructive sense out of a past decision by generating a 
principle that best justifies it, and by bringing that principle to bear on the case at 
hand. Why should we think that HYPO has any skill at that endeavor? 
 
My conclusion is that artificial intelligence is, in the domain of legal 
reasoning, a kind of upscale LEXIS or WESTLAW—bearing, perhaps, the same 
relationship to these services as LEXIS and WESTLAW have to Shepherd’s. A 
terrific advantage is that the relevant programs can assemble a wide range of 
relevant cases without turning up so much that does not bear on the problem at 
hand. But the more extravagant claims on behalf of artificial intelligence in law 
are based on a crude picture of legal reasoning, one that disregards the need to 
                                                 
10 See id. 
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root judgments of analogousness, or disanalogousness, in judgments of principle 
and policy. 
 
III. Three Qualifications 
 
There are three qualifications to what I have said thus far. First, 
precedents will sometimes sharply constrain the law’s room to maneuver. 
Assume, for example, that an employee alleges that she was discharged for 
cooperating with the authorities about apparent tax fraud by her employer, and 
that a previous case says that an employer may not discharge an employee for 
cooperating with the authorities about apparent drug use by her employer. 
Sometimes the case at hand cannot plausibly be distinguished from previous 
cases, because there is no principle that can support the precedent without also  
producing a certain result in the case at hand. An upscale version of LEXIS, one 
that has a full stock of precedents on hand, should be able to identify and resolve 
problems of this kind. 
 
The second qualification is that we cannot exclude the possibility that 
eventually, computer programs will be able both to generate competing 
principles for analogical reasoning and to give grounds for thinking that one or 
another principle is best. Perhaps computers will be able to engage in the kind of 
empirical testing that is often a crucial  (though overlooked) basis for good legal 
outcomes. Perhaps computers will be able to say whether a particular normative 
principle fits well with the normative commitments of most people in the 
relevant community. I have hardly suggested that these are unimaginable 
possibilities. The possibilities for growth, in the domain of artificial intelligence, 
cannot be predicted at this exceptionally early stage. 
 
The third qualification is that the weak and strong versions of the claims 
for artificial intelligence in law, as I have described them, are really poles on a 
continuum, not a dichotomy, and there is reason to hope for movement from the 
weak in the direction of the strong. In fact Ashley moves in this direction insofar 
as he attempts to order cases by determining the strength, or weakness, of one or 
another connection between the case at hand and the analogies. An effort to 
specify relevant factors, and to order their importance, is a step in the direction of 
producing analogy-warranting principles.11 If artificial intelligence is not now 
able to engage in legal reasoning, it does not follow that it cannot get closer to 
                                                 
11 See Kevin Ashley, An AI Model of Case-Based  Legal Argument from a Jurisprudential 
Viewpoint (forthcoming). 
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doing exactly that. At this stage, there are promising experiments, ones that 
could be quite helpful to lawyers.  
 
I have emphasized that those who cannot make evaluative arguments 
cannot engage in analogical reasoning as it occurs in law. Computer programs 
do not yet reason analogically. But this proposition should not be confused with 
the suggestion that in the nature of things, evaluative arguments are uniquely 
the province of human beings, or that computer programs will never be able to 
help human beings with it, or even to engage on it on their own. 
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